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1. Language vs. Cognition 
The study of language evolution has gone from almost taboo to exuberant in just 
a few decades, with many new ideas and theories now proposed and debated. 
How language evolved is tightly linked to how human species evolved, as there 
is no more distinctive characteristic of our species than our language. Language 
is also the most tangible aspect of human cognition, the prism through which we 
get a glimpse into our other cognitive abilities. As put in Planer & Sterelny (2021, 
henceforth P&S), “since language is manifestly central to human life […] an ac-
count of the origins of human cognition and social life must include an account of 
the emergence of language” (p. xix). Consider this: When our otherwise im-
mensely intricate, complex language abilities are just a bit off, just a mere 5%, we 
are judged as impaired, as having a disorder, or as not highly intelligent. We may 
be sent to therapy, and we are likely not to find the most desirable jobs or mates 
(both of relevance for natural/sexual selection). On the other hand, if we are not 
dexterous with using tools, if we are, say, 50% worse in our abilities than the typ-
ical person at, for example, assembling anything from Ikea or painting a straight 
line on the wall, we are still quite fine, certainly not considered as having a disor-
der. We can also be not musical at all, and not artistic at all, and we will not be 
considered as having a cognitive disorder. This is not to say—not at all—that we 
do not get attracted to good singing, or beautiful art and artefacts; this is just to 




necessities of life. Language, on the other hand, is a necessity of life, and it is not 
rare at all: It is everywhere where there are humans—all day, every day. This must 
be telling us something about our priorities, whether well-placed or not, which 
are certainly relevant for the considerations of genetic selection. 
 Nonetheless, interestingly, there is a tendency in current evolutionary the-
orizing to try to reduce language abilities to other cognitive abilities, and to argue 
that the genetic foundation or adaptation for specifically language is not there, or 
is not of any significance, and that language abilities (e.g., syntax), emerged cul-
turally, simply by relying on whatever genetic predispositions or adaptations 
evolved for other abilities (e.g., stone toolmaking). As discussed in Progovac 
(2019a), this view (of no consequential genetic selection for language) seems to be 
characteristic of two completely opposing camps in the study of language evolu-
tion, the saltationist (one-mutation) camp (e.g., Berwick & Chomsky 2011, 2016), 
and the gradualist cultural evolution camp. As stated in Steels’ (2011) overview, 
adherents to cultural evolution consider that language features per se do not orig-
inate through genetic evolution—and are therefore not linked to biological fitness. 
P&S’s book falls into this latter category. It is an expertly written and intricately 
argued monograph, which aims to integrate a host of pieces and details from a 
variety of fields into a coherent story about human evolution. It is an erudite piece 
of scholarship, but still presented in a highly accessible style, able to appeal to a 
wider readership. 
P&S put emphasis in this book on the evolution of cooperation and on social 
factors, and their strategy is to “nest an incremental view of the emergence of lan-
guage within an equally incremental view of the evolution of human social life” 
(p. 25). In other words, the aim of this book is to elaborate on the lifeways of an-
cient hominins in such a detail that would allow them to deduce the cognitive and 
communicative capacities, including the capacity for language, needed to support 
these lifeways. P&S consider that the theory of mind, causal reasoning, hierar-
chical structure, and vocal control all had to be in place before language emerged, 
so that language could then emerge culturally. The recurring theme of their mon-
ograph is the gradual evolution of culture, language, and cognition more gener-
ally. The two main strengths of this monograph are (i) its plausible and detailed 
outline of a gradual evolution of human lifeways and culture, and (ii) its system-
atic attempts to correlate various lifestyle milestones with the cognitive and lin-
guistic milestones. Regarding (i), P&S make a good case for language and cogni-
tive evolution as a gradual, step by step process, where each stage needs to rely 
on the previous one, bringing some small but tangible advantages. This is not only 
the most feasible evolutionary pathway toward complexity, often extravagant in 
the case of language, but typological variation across languages is better captured 
within this view (see Section 5), in comparison to the view that syntax sprang into 
existence suddenly as a result of one single mutation, maintaining uniformity 
across all cultures (e.g., Berwick & Chomsky 2011, 2016). P&S’s stated goal is to 
show that language evolution does not need to rely on a miracle, that is on an 
inexplicable jump in complexity (p. 212). I cannot agree more with their view that 
language (and cognitive) evolution was gradual, continuous with various precur-
sors and pre-adaptations, and that it involved a multitude of factors acting simul-
taneously and synergistically upon one another. Where I believe modifications 
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are needed, as I outline below, is in the nature and the role assigned to the early 
stages of language and syntax in this gene–culture spiral that led to language, spe-
cifically the role of language itself in its own evolution, both cultural and genetic.  
Regarding (ii), this book is rich in claims and details concerning possible 
causes or correlates of language evolution, advocating important roles of phe-
nomena as diverse as: Obligate bipedal lifeways (which freed hands for gestur-
ing),1 hunting, tidal foraging, population size, singing, the control of fire, and es-
pecially stone toolmaking. P&S conclude by saying that their aim “has not been 
to provide an exhaustive survey of the options, still less to endorse one” (p. 211), 
and that instead they “strongly suspect that the Sapiens expansion and transfor-
mation of cooperation […] depended on the simultaneous effects of a number of 
factors” (pp. 211–12). However, there are two broad points I would like to make 
in this respect. First, among all these factors, there should certainly be room for 
one more player, and that is the contribution of early forms of language itself, 
with all its amazing detail. Secondly, in order to test any of these claims, which 
the authors themselves often characterize as speculative but plausible, and to 
move from plausibility to evidence and proof, one does need to converge on (or 
endorse, if you will) a specific (linguistic) proposal—specific enough that it can be 
rendered into specific hypotheses to be tested.  
It is not my intention (nor ability) to respond to each of the claims P&S make 
in their monograph, which are many and various. Instead, I have selected a few 
that seem important and influential in the field of language evolution, and that 
are closest to my own expertise as a syntactician and linguist. One of them is the 
role that toolmaking might have played in the evolution of syntax. 
 
2. Was Syntax Borrowed from Stone Toolmaking? 
One of P&S’s main arguments in the monograph is that the cognitive capacities 
for syntax, specifically for creating sentences, were borrowed from stone toolmak-
ing (p. 119), in the sense that the genetic foundation for this ability was set in place 
by selection for the ability to make stone tools, and that, subsequently, the evolu-
tion of syntax itself simply advanced through cultural processes, needing no fur-
ther genetic adaptations. According to them, the development of these tool tech-
nologies depended on the expansion of hierarchical control and were thus se-
lected for computational capacities that “made it possible for hominins to fluently 
use hierarchically structured sentences” (p. 148). In other words, “the computa-
tional machinery underpinning hierarchical structure evolved in the service of 
technological skill, the production of sophisticated stone tools in particular” (p. 
xvii). Below I give three reasons why reducing syntax to stone toolmaking cannot 
be the right approach.2 
 
1 In this respect, P&S advocate a gesture-first hypothesis for language evolution.  
2 Interestingly, P&S state that animal communication is about the immediate scene, but that 
human communication is not. Human communication is certainly not always about the im-
mediate scene, but it can be, and often is, when we say, for example, ‘There’s a racoon right 
there!’ or ‘What a lovely sunset!’ or ‘Drop that gun!’ or ‘Eat your broccoli!’ or ‘You look wor-




There is no doubt, of course, that any new cultural invention that gets 
spread across a population relies on prior adaptations, and on the general pre-
existing abilities. So, it makes perfect sense that tool use of the kind and magni-
tude manifested in humans has not been invented by say birch trees, for example, 
tools that would allow them to draw water from a nearby lake in case of droughts, 
no matter how adaptive this may be for them. So, stone toolmaking had its own 
many and various precursors and pre-adaptations, including bipedal mode. And 
if stone toolmaking had to rely on such pre-existing abilities, then, of course, it is 
expected that the evolution of human syntax, and human language more gener-
ally, also needed to be consistent with all sorts of predispositions, including those 
overlapping with toolmaking. To be completely clear here, and not be misunder-
stood, I am not saying that human syntax was some kind of evolutionary fluke 
that was brought about by a single random mutation, which may be the view of 
the saltationists cited above. In my own work, I have argued consistently against 
such a view, and, one more time, I have no doubt that pre-adaptations for syntax, 
and continuity more generally, are crucial. But that certainly does not mean that 
these predispositions or pre-adaptations are all there is to the evolution of syntax, 
in the genetic sense, and this also does not mean that stone toolmaking was what 
caused or enabled the evolution of syntax. Not at all. Here are three reasons, in 
addition to the reasons given in Section 1, why this line of reasoning does not 
follow. 
First, it is perfectly plausible that both phenomena—that is, both toolmaking 
and syntax—rely on some more ancient shared predispositions that predate both, 
as P&S themselves suggest later in the book (p. 141).3 Second, it is also possible 
that the early emergence and entrenchment of proto-grammar (perhaps of the 
kind described in Section 5) contributed to the evolution of Broca’s area in a way 
that also helped develop more sophisticated means of toolmaking; the two could 
have certainly been engaged in a feedback loop, both contributing to the evolution 
of Broca’s area. Third, the existence of a pre-adaptation for some ability does not 
at all preclude the possibility for further genetic selection and adaptation for the 
newly found function, meaning that it was entirely possible that each of these 
skills, toolmaking and the use of grammar, have been subject to genetic selection 
in their own right. I elaborate below. 
 
that language that is less displaced (more immediate) can often be shown to be grammati-
cally less complex, as discussed with some specific small clauses (i.e. mini sentences) in, for 
example, Progovac (2015; see also Newmeyer 2005 for subordination). This is just one place 
where linguistic detail is important and useful in reconstructing the linguistic past with some 
precision, and which shows that syntax/language does not simply reduce to binary opposi-
tions such as displaced vs. not; hierarchical vs. not, as further discussed below, as well as in 
Section 5. 
3 P&S themselves point out that the origins of enhanced action planning and control must be 
deeper than hominin toolmaking, as their precursors are found in other primates (p. 141). 
So, for example, premotor cortex F5 in Old World monkeys is considered homologous with 
Broca’s area in humans, as it, too, is recruited not only for motor behavior, but also for visual 
and auditory processing (p. 141). If so, then syntax, to the extent that it depends on these 
motor and multimodal abilities, did not have to wait for stone toolmaking to be perfected, 
or to rely on this development directly, as there was a previous, common foundation/pre-
adaptation for both. 
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In other words, regardless of the ultimate precursors and pre-adaptations 
(which every newly emerging phenomenon will have), syntax (and language 
more generally) would have also, itself, been subject to natural/sexual selection 
forces, and would have thus contributed to the genetic make-up of humans, which 
in turn would have contributed to further enhancement of various other cognitive 
phenomena. As put in Pinker & Bloom (1990), it is impossible to make sense of 
highly complex phenomena that are especially well designed for a specific func-
tion, such as is the structure of the eye, without acknowledging that it (the eye) 
evolved for the purpose of seeing; evolution is the only physical process that can 
create an eye because it is the only physical process in which the criterion of being 
good at seeing can play a causal role. Just like being good at crafting tools would 
have improved that very ability through generations, including by genetic selec-
tion, so would, for sure, being good at using language and syntax, and the discus-
sion below will touch upon just how immensely complex that ability is, and how 
reliably and effortlessly it is acquired. As P&S themselves state, citing West-Eber-
hard (2003), “genes are the followers, and not the leaders, in evolution […] selec-
tion will favor the genetic variants that acquire the behavior more rapidly or reli-
ably […]” (p. 27). I cannot agree more, but then why should this not also apply to 
syntax, and language more generally? Why would the evolution of syntax follow 
some genes, set in place for something else? Isn’t syntax acquired rapidly and re-
liably? Isn’t it in fact acquired much more rapidly and reliably than toolmaking? 
Why would syntax or language abilities be exempt from these routine processes 
of evolution? 
As a syntactician (although as somebody who knows very little about tool-
making), I do need to point out that there is so much more to syntax than what 
motor control, toolmaking, and syntax may have in common, and I am sure that 
there is also more to stone toolmaking than what it shares with syntax.4 Contrary 
to what is often claimed by saltationists such as Berwick and Chomsky (see, e.g., 
Berwick & Chomsky 2011, 2016), syntax (or language more generally) does not 
reduce to the hierarchy-creating Merge, which basically allows one to combine 
and recombine, which may be what prompted this idea that syntax reduces to 
assembling tools. Human syntax is a composite of various hierarchical and flat 
constructions, seamlessly interwoven together, some systematic and some rather 
quirky, with a multitude of abstract grammatical categories whose existence typ-
ically arises through (gradual) grammaticalization processes, and which have 
their own predictable place in the tree of syntax (see Progovac 2015 for a detailed 
reconstruction and decomposition of various syntactic phenomena; also Progovac 
2019b for Merge and Minimalism more generally in the light of evolution). And, 
above all, syntax is acquired effortlessly and reliably by almost all people (barring 
certain language disorders), and is processed also reliably, and with lightning 
speed, none of which is the case with toolmaking. Even though P&S state that 
their strategy is to “nest an incremental view of the emergence of language within 
an equally incremental view of the evolution of human social life” (p. 25), I see 
 
4 Reducing syntax to toolmaking must have some consequences, and I would like to know 
what its predictions are and how they would be tested. Are people who are especially good 
at grammar also especially good at tool use or toolmaking? Do cultures that do not make 




imbalance in their book: While one side of this equation has been presented with 
good detail, the social lifeways side, the incremental emergence of syntax or lan-
guage has not been presented equally at all, as I further elaborate below, as well 
as in Section 5.   
P&S’s Section 5.6 goes in great detail over the stages through which tool 
technology passed. It expresses, and rightly so, admiration for the achievements 
in tool technology, specifically in the third stage, starting at around 800,000 years 
ago, concluding that “the degree of manual precision and foresight shown by 
these toolmakers is astounding” (p. 144). I completely agree. But I hasten to add 
that such tools, or any other tools for that matter, are no match for the sophistica-
tion of human syntax and language more generally, and for how fit our brains are 
specifically for processing them. We can just take a look at one chapter of P&S’s 
book and consider how many words and sentence structures just this one chapter 
offers, and how many totally different sentences with different meanings. And 
just consider how much these sentences have been able to convey to the reader 
about a topic as amazing (and bizarre) from the point of view of nature as are the 
evolutionary developments in human and hominin lineages, describing the be-
ings we have never seen (early hominins), and the times whose depth is hard to 
fathom. But it is all made quite accessible to us through language, as are all sorts 
of other topics. For syntax does not just assemble two dead pieces of stone or 
wood that are lying around; it assembles words and morphemes, each alive and 
bursting with meaning and connotations, and it can assemble sentences with a 
hundred such words, or more, placing each with incredible ease and precision in 
its designated hierarchical spot, thus constraining their meanings and functions 
to converge on a precise message. And for this one-hundred-word sentence that 
our syntax can so easily assemble, in a matter of seconds, it is not just that the 
words and morphemes are lying around like bricks waiting to be picked up and 
built into a house. Not at all. These words and morphemes themselves are crea-
tions of our linguistic mind, stored in our mental dictionaries, and we command 
on average tens of thousands of such words, and often even more. So, when we 
create this one-hundred-word sentence, each word must be carefully selected 
among many alternative possibilities, and these choices depend not only on the 
meaning, but also on the multitude of various syntactic particularities that words 
carry with them. But our syntax juggles all these words, thousands upon thou-
sands of them, hardly ever dropping a ball. This cannot possibly be a trait that did 
not need any genetic adaptation beyond the abilities of motor control and tool 
assembly. I think that we often forget just how much work syntax does for us, and 
how much we take it for granted.5 
 
3. What Kind of Feedback Loop? 
Language is specifically discussed in P&S’s Chapter 7 “From Protolanguage to 
Language.” Here, the authors state that “if only late Pleistocene anatomically 
 
5 P&S refer to “the easy problem of syntax” (p. 126), which “poses no deep mysteries” (p. 129). 
There is truly nothing easy or straightforward about reconstructing the evolutionary trajec-
tory of syntax, once its details and variability across languages are taken into account.  
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modern humans (AMHs) had full language, we need at least a tentative explana-
tion of that fact. We propose it was because only those humans cooperated so 
extensively” (p. 184), suggesting that cooperative lifestyles caused language to 
emerge. However, as will be elaborated below, cooperation cannot cause lang-
uage to emerge, but it can facilitate its solidification, once language starts emerg-
ing, which means that some kind of feedback loop had to be in place to facilitate 
the evolution of both language and cooperation in humans. But what kind of feed-
back loop? 
P&S invoke the self-domestication hypothesis of human origins, as a mech-
anism for decreasing reactive aggression in our species specifically (p. 205), by 
selecting against aggressive individuals. This is a promising line of inquiry be-
cause the propensity for reactive aggression, related to (lack of) cooperation, 
leaves a fossil signature, and has a genetic foundation. However, if we conclude 
that the reduction of reactive aggression somehow caused language, rather than 
that the concurrent emergence of early forms of language actually engaged in a 
feedback loop with self-domestication (see below for this type of proposal), then 
we are at square one again: because neither bonobos (a self-domesticated species), 
nor other super domesticated animals, such as cows or chicken, have developed 
language, certainly not of the kind that humans have. For such an immensely in-
tricate, rich, and complex phenomenon as human language to emerge on an evo-
lutionary scene, there had to be multiple factors acting simultaneously, and syn-
ergistically, one upon another, including selection for the emerging ability to use 
language. Language itself should certainly not be excluded from this synergy—
why would it be? 
In fact, it is fully expected that the cultural emergence of early forms of lang-
uage was a crucial contributor to both language evolution and cooperation/self-
domestication. A specific proposal advocating such a feedback loop, involving 
reduction in reactive aggression (via self-domestication), has been developed in 
Progovac & Benítez-Burraco (2019) and Benítez-Burraco & Progovac (2021). In this 
view, the ebbing and flowing of reactive (and proactive) aggression are seen as 
closely tied to the different stages of language evolution, with the emergence of 
verbal aggression/insult (associated with simplest syntax) constituting an im-
portant milestone in the gradual transition from physical fighting to verbal/cog-
nitive contest.6 P&S themselves conclude that self-domestication itself (with its re-
duction in reactive aggression) can only be a part of the story, as another factor is 
needed (p. 208). I completely agree. But the other factor, the elephant in the room, 
can certainly be the emergence of early forms of language, respectively, syntax. 
 
6 P&S state that early proto-language was used to facilitate cooperation and coordination, but 
that today we use language also for teasing each other, to tell a joke or a story (p. 47). How-
ever, there is no reason to exclude the relevance of joking and teasing (which can be contin-
uous with insult/verbal aggression) from earliest proto-language, as they would have been 
especially adaptive at these early times, and are also more continuous with our ancestors’ 
mindsets, providing more graceful evolutionary continuity (see e.g. Progovac 2015, 2016). 
Other primates seem quite capable of teasing and joking. To take just one example, as re-
ported in Patterson & Gordon (1993), the gorilla Koko was not only capable of producing 





Even though P&S’s main argument is that language abilities are parasitic on 
other cognitive abilities, and on the genetic foundation put in place to support 
those other abilities, they seem to doubt themselves occasionally, and I find this 
promising. For example, they allow for the possibility that “natural selection has 
equipped us with many language-specific cognitive adaptations” (p. 112). That 
would mean that, after all, there was genetic selection for language features spe-
cifically. Then, later, P&S state that “this is not to say, however, that language has 
not exerted an evolutionary influence on the structure of this computational sys-
tem. […] Indeed, we would be most surprised if the evolution of language made 
no difference to these control and recognition mechanisms” (p. 150). Indeed, and 
for that reason, one does need to enter the specifics of language into this feedback 
loop, for it is not enough to just mention the adaptiveness of language here and 
there, in generic terms. One does need to bite the bullet and hypothesize (and then 
test) just exactly what kind of language, and what kind of syntax, was subject to 
genetic selection, and how it interacted with, and contributed to, all the other evo-
lutionary developments. 
 
4. Who Needs Language and Who Doesn’t? 
Another line of reasoning that I do not find convincing are the arguments to the 
effect that hominins developed language because they ‘needed’ it. For example, 
P&S state that the hominins that lived after about the first third of the Pleistocene 
were “both capable of using a protolanguage and very likely needed a protolan-
guage, one with flexibility and displaced reference” (p. xvii).7 But, in truth, who 
would not need language?8 If somehow bonobos (who have been argued to be 
self-domesticated, too) were to manage to develop some (proto)language, would 
that not be highly adaptive, and would not that seem in retrospect as something 
that they needed? In fact, they seem to need it really badly for survival, as so many 
other species do. Nature does not just give a species or individuals what they 
need. Evolving something as useful and complex as language had to be partly a 
matter of chance or some “lucky break” as put in P&S (e.g., cultural emergence of 
simple forms of grammar), partly a matter of many other factors emerging and 
converging at the same time, in a positive feedback loop (e.g., reduction in reac-
tive aggression; various environmental factors), and partly a matter of ruthless 
genetic selection for the phenotypes whose brains were just a bit better equipped 
to use and learn these newly emerging forms of language. For that reason, a 
strong, specific version of a gene-culture feedback loop involving the specifics of 
language is needed. 
While P&S occasionally state that there was a coevolution of social and lin-
guistic complexity (211), and that “advances in hominin communication systems 
[…] fed back to further transform cooperation, creating a positive coevolutionary 
 
7 P&S also state that “mid-Pleistocene hominins needed to be able to add arbitrary signs to 
their lexicon, if their social capacities made that possible” (p. 216). 
8 It could be that the use of the word ‘need’ in this respect was a shortcut for something else, 
but I mention it here because it may be reflective of P&S’s unidirectional, deterministic view 
of language evolution, portraying it almost as an inevitable consequence of other evolution-
ary developments (that needed it). 
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feedback loop” (p. 181), they at the same time systematically advocate a unidirec-
tional view especially when it comes to genetic evolution, where it is not clear 
what, if any, the return effect of early forms of language would have been. For 
example, on the same page, they say: “We have considered several factors that 
might explain the fact that sapiens found themselves on a trajectory toward hy-
per-prosociality, and hence full language,” suggesting again that language was a 
result of human pro-sociality, and not a contributor to it. Similarly, on the final 
page of the monograph, P&S state that perhaps only sapiens developed “the com-
plex forms of cooperation that required the resources of full language” (p. 222). 
P&S do acknowledge that their connections between language and social lifeways 
are imprecise and speculative, and that the specifics of language are not dealt with 
in the book (e.g., p. 214). The next section aims to show that the devil is in the 
detail… 
 
5. Some Details of Proto-Syntax 
P&S do consider some details of syntax, which is welcome, as without the detail 
one cannot start a meaningful discussion on this topic. For example, they consider 
that fixed word order (SVO or subject–verb–object) was the initial state of proto-
language, and that some languages later developed other means of marking these 
distinctions, such as case and agreement (p. 118), leading to the subsequent loss 
of fixed word order in many languages. In this respect, their proposal is related 
to Jackendoff’s (2002) Agent First proposal. P&S link this proposed stage of linear 
SVO syntax to archeological traces of enhanced forms of cooperation (p. 128). 
However, if proto-languages already converged on such a straightforward way 
of expressing who does what to whom with a simple SVO ordering, it is not clear 
at all why they would have lost this excellent solution. Why do many languages, 
as they point out, have free word order, and even more languages (certainly more 
than half) show other word order types, distinct from SVO? And why have so 
many languages developed all these complicated and often baroque agreement 
and case systems, whose main purpose is again to distinguish subjects from ob-
jects? At the very least, it seems safe to conclude that starting with a proto-lang-
uage with the fixed SVO word order hardly provides that baseline for incremental 
evolution which P&S are seeking, the baseline which would lead to a next stage, 
and then a next stage, and where each stage brings some tangible advantages. 
This just highlights the difficulty of identifying such baseline for syntax without 
considering the details of syntax, as well as the details of syntactic variation across 
languages. 
In my own reconstruction of proto-syntax, I have relied on some stable the-
oretical, as well as typological, postulates for syntax. This led me, surprisingly, to 
the earliest stage of syntax which does not in fact show any subject/object distinc-
tions, and only operates with a two-slot syntactic mold initially, a small clause, 
with only a verb and one single argument, not differentiated for semantic/the-
matic role (see Progovac 2015, 2016, for many examples of such constructs across 
present-day languages, which can serve as proxies of this stage). It would have 
been only later, and based on this foundation/baseline, that transitivity in lan-




different cultures, yielding, for example, two main case-marking types: nomina-
tive-accusative and ergative-absolutive types. In addition, some cultures devel-
oped serial verb constructions, exhibiting sequences of two (or more) small 
clauses, the first one typically introducing the agent with a verb, and the second 
one introducing the patient with a verb. Starting with a two-slot small clause base-
line (or common denominator), which operates with only one argument, goes a 
long way toward explaining this profound cross-linguistic variation in expressing 
transitivity, where each solution nonetheless involves only a small tweak of the 
baseline. This kind of approach not only lends itself to incremental evolution of 
syntactic complexity, but it is also specific enough to be testable. 
Even by looking at this one specific syntactic example of transitivity across 
languages, one can see that humans across cultures struggled to just develop and 
grammaticalize subject/object distinctions, again something we take for granted, 
and one can also see that the reason why transitive grammars evolved can be di-
rectly linked to incremental communicative advantages, rather than being a mere 
consequence of a generic ability to assemble and reassemble things hierarchically, 
i.e. to merge and remerge. In other words, in this view, it was the struggle to de-
velop and grammaticalize various linguistic distinctions, including subjec-
thood/objecthood, that led to the layered syntax (by tweaking the baseline), ra-
ther than hierarchy emerging for its own sake (or for the sake of stone toolmak-
ing), and then these linguistic distinctions just populating these hierarchical lay-
ers, as some kind of ready-made products. There is a lot of discussion of this phe-
nomenon in Progovac (2015, 2016; see also Progovac & Benítez-Burraco 2019), ac-
companied by an attempt to connect this specific proposal to the hominin time-
line.9 As do P&S, I also believe that specific interdisciplinary cross-fertilizations 
between linguistic and archeological and anthropological reconstructions are nec-
essary, and I am sure that there is plenty of room for improvement in this respect 
on my end, just as I have suggested there is on the P&S’s end. But that just means 
that more dialogue is necessary across different disciplines, as well as more test-
ing, and that the details and reconstructions on both ends, both linguistic and ar-
cheological and anthropological, are absolutely necessary to get to the bottom of 
human evolution. In this endeavor, there is just no escape from the details of lan-
guage, or from linguistics, for that matter. 
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9 In a nutshell, in Progovac (2015, 2016), I have proposed, based on these profound differences 
in the expression of subjecthood, and transitivity more generally, that the hierarchical stage, 
and transitivity more specifically, did not emerge in all its complexity and in a uniform fash-
ion only once (in Africa), but instead multiple times, and independently, either within Africa, 
or after the dispersion from Africa. This has specific implications for the timing of the emer-
gence of hierarchical syntax, as well as for the hominin timeline. 
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